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 Abstract—The advances in hardware speed has being rapidly 
increased rapidly in the recent years, which will lead to the 
ability to decrypt well known decryption algorithms in short 
time. This motivated many researchers to investigate better 
techniques to prevent disclosing and eavesdropping of 
communicated data. Quantum Cryptography is a promising 
solution, since it relies on the prosperities of quantum physics 
that ensure no change in the quantum state without the 
knowledge of the sender/receiver. Quantum Communication 
Scheme for Blind Signature with Two-Particle Entangled 
Quantum-Trits was proposed by Jinjing et al. [1] That scheme 
uses qutits during the communications and the process of the 
encryption is not clearly defined. In this paper we suggest a 
modification of Jinjing et al. protocol using qubits and qutrits 
during the encryption and decryption which proposed by Zhou et 
al. [2] The proposed algorithms enhances the efficiency of that 
scheme and creates a quantum cryptosystem environment to 
exchange the data in a secure way. During the communications, 
all the messages are encrypted using the the private key of the 
sender and a third party verifies the authenticity and the 
blindness of the signature.  
 
Keywords— Quantum communication; Blind signature; Quantum 
signature; Quantum cryptography 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The security of information, either local or being 
transmitted over the internet, is a main goal for individuals or 
organizations because it contains private or valuable data that 
could be used by intruders in a way that affect their life in 
different aspects. Cryptography is a field that is concerned on 
how to protect and secure the information from attackers and 
unauthorized users. In general, cryptography is divided into 
two parts; symmetric encryption and asymmetric encryption. 
For symmetric encryption, the same key is used for cipher and 
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decipher by sender and receiver, which implies that this key 
must be kept secured. For asymmetric encryption, there are 
two different keys; private and public. Both techniques’ 
strength is inversely related with the computational power. 
That means that encryption fails under brute force attack with 
sufficient powerful computers.  
Quantum Cryptography was introduced in 1984 by 
Charles Bennett and Gilles Brassard [3]. The authors proposed 
a new algorithm (BB86) based on Quantum Communication 
Networks, where the transmission depends on photons. 
Quantum cryptography utilizes Heisenberg’s Uncertainty 
principle which states that when a quantum state is measured, 
then it is disturbed and leads to incomplete information about 
the system. Eavesdropping on a quantum communication 
alerts legal users and this feature is the main advantage of 
quantum cryptography[4]. 
A digital signature is used to insure the authenticity and 
the validity of who sent the message and signed the 
transmitted document. It ensures that the original message has 
not been changed by someone who tries to break the security 
of the message [5].  
The signature in classical cryptography has some 
characteristics including identifiability, undeniableness and 
unforgeability which provide a mechanism to decide who 
verifies that signature. David Chaum [6]introduced the idea of 
a blind signature as an electronic signature where the content 
of a message is blinded prior the process to sign it. Blind 
signature is involved in privacy-related protocols where the 
party that signs the message and party who writes it are 
different[7]. Several algorithms that use Quantum 
Cryptography were proposed in literature. They differ 
essentially in the choice of the parameters between the 
communicating parties such as the number of states that a 
quantum bit has, and the key process forming. In this paper we 
present an ideal environment of quantum communication 
scheme for blind signature with two-particle entangled 
quantum qubits and qutrits.  
II. RELATED WORK 
Jinjing et al. [1] proposed a quantum communication 
scheme for blind signature with two-particle entangled 
quantum-trits (qutrit). The authors introduced a third fully 
trusted participant Trent (the arbitrator and proxy) which is 
responsible to help Alice and Bob trust each other before 
communication verify the legalization and authenticity of the 
blind signature and provide a batch of efficient proxy blind 
signatures to Alice. Their model utilizes public key principle 
with qutrit usage; transformation of a message to qutrits.  
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In [2], the authors introduced a new algorithm to qubit 
with hybrid keys .The encryption and decryption operations 
uses a quantum key and classical key which are shared 
between Alice and Bob before starting the communication 
between the two parties. Alice and Bob are communicating 
through a classical channel which is also used to check the 
presence of Eve who is trying to attack the communication. 
The encryption and the decryption operations use the basic 
Hadamard gate and Controlled-NOT gates. To start the 
communication, Alice adds random bits to her message 
and encrypts it with quantum block encryption 
algorithm. Then, Bob decrypts the cipher text that was 
received from Alice. After that, Alice declares her check bits 
and their corresponding positions to Bob who is going to 
compare the received check bits with the bits that Alice 
already declared. If the bits are the same, they continue the 
communication. Otherwise, if the bits are different, which 
means someone attacked the channel, the shared keys are 
canceled and they must establish new keys to continue the 
communication in safe way. 
In[8] a quantum signature in service-oriented vehicular 
networks was proposed. In the initial phase, the sender and the 
receiver share a quantum key and generate EPR pairs to 
construct a special correlation between each other. In the 
signature phase, the signatory produces the signature by using 
EPR pairs and sends it to Bob. In the verification phase, the 
receiver has the capability to identify the signature by using a 
quantum key and EPR pairs. Based on this relation, the 
receiver can reconstruct the original quantum states to verify 
whether the signature is derived from initial quantum 
entangled state or not. Also, two quantum unitary operations 
are used, I gate and X gate, to represent classical bits 0 and 1.  
In[9], the authors proposed a quantum digital signature 
scheme based on quantum mechanics. The security in the 
protocol depends on the quantum one-way function that 
should be easy to compute and hard to invert. An arbitrator 
was introduced to authenticate and validate the signing 
message. Public quantum keys are used to ensure the validity 
of the signature and one time pad to verify the security of 
quantum information. There are three algorithms in a digital 
signature scheme, a key generation algorithm which randomly 
selects the private key, a signing algorithm and a verifying 
algorithm. The proposed scheme provides some security 
services such as security against repudiation since Alice 
cannot deny her signature because Bob will return to the 
arbitrator who has a copy of the signature. Also, the arbitrator 
tests if the signature has been forged or not by comparing that 
with its current information. Also, it provides Security against 
forgery. In this case any attempt to alter the signed quantum 
states or to recover Alice’s private keys and generates a 
“legal” signature will be detected. 
Wen and Liu [10], proposed a quantum message signature 
scheme without an arbitrator. This scheme has N-pairs M and 
M
’
 of particles that are created by Alice to carry the quantum 
message. Bob creates N-pairs of particles A and B in EPR 
(Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen) states. Alice saves the particle M 
and transmits the particle M
’
 to Bob. When Bob receives the 
particle M
’
 he sends particle A to Alice and keeps particle B. 
Then the state with triplet particles Ai, Bi, and Mi is produced. 
For each triplet state, Bell-base measurement is implemented 
by Alice on both Mi and Ai and her result will be recorded as 
Ri. Each Bell state Ri represents two classical bits which Alice 
encrypted those states by using Vernam algorithm to make 
signature S. Bob decrypts the signature that was received from 
Alice through the classical channel. Unitary operations Ui 
have to be applied on Bob’s particle Bi to extract the initial 
state Mi. Then Alice’s signature S is accepted by Bob only 
when both Bi and M
’
i states are equivalent. This kind of 
scheme has a private symmetric key for both sender and 
receiver without having to share it with the third party which 
means that the arbitrator is not needed in this system. 
In [11], the authors discuss three problems of the scheme 
presented in [9]. First, the quantum one way function is not 
defined clearly. Second, the private key was not used for 
signing the message and third, there are some problems during 
the signing and the verification phases of the algorithm. While 
generating the key, the authors do not specify the quantum 
states. During the generation process, we know the signer’s 
public key and its corresponding private key. If we combine 
the signing process we can see the signer Alice does not use 
her private key which is a significant security flaw.  
III. QUANTUM COMMUNICATION FOR BLIND SIGNATURE 
The classical blind signature algorithm contains three 
parties: Alice, Bob and the third Party Trend. Alice who is the 
sender is able to generate a signature for her message. Bob 
who is the receiver can identify if the signature is from Alice 
or not by the third party Trend whose main task is the 
authentication of the signed message[12]. The quantum 
communication scheme for blind signature is shown in Fig.  1 
and works as follows:  
(1) Alice sends a message that is encrypted by her private key 
to the receiver Bob. 
(2) Bob adds his information to the received message which 
he encrypts by the key that is shared between him and 
Alice.  
(3) Bob sends that message as well as his information to Alice 
which is considered as the blind signature.  
(4) Alice receives the blind signature and decrypts it with the 
shared key with Bob and checks if the received message 
has not been changed.  
(5) Now, the two parties Alice and Bob send a message to the 
third party Trend containing the result of the signature 
and Trend checks and validate the signature. 
(6) If the result of the validation of the signature is positive, 
Alice sends a message to Trend. 
(7) Trend checks those messages by applying Bob’s personal 
information and Trend’s random checking photons 
A. Initialization of the Communication 
We assume that the secret keys Kab, Kac, Kbc are 
distributed for Alice and Bob; Kab is the secret key between 
Alice and Bob and can be used in two cases twice for Bob’s 
encryption and Alice’s decryption in the first communication. 
However, Kac and Kbc are used for the communications 
between Alice and the third party Trend and between Bob and 
Trend. Alice has her key Ka which can be used for encrypting 
the received message that Bob signed it before. Fig.  2 shows 
the relationship in the communications between Alice, Bob 
and Trend. Furthermore, Alice has amount of message that 
Bob should sign. We annotate the message 
as              , where every message has n trits.    
                         , where M1 is selected initially as 
the first attempt for trying quantum blind signature. 
 
Fig.  1: Quantum communication protocol for blind signature. 
 
Fig.  2: Distribution of the quantum keys for blind signature.  
 
B. Trying Blind Signature 
Alice generates a qutrit string |ψM1> to be used for trying 
message. Alice converts the trying message M1 into a qutrit 
string |ψM1> that we have in the following string n qutrits, 
where:  
                                             
Also, |ψM1> has a single qutrit |ψ1j> where can be shown as:  
|        |                  , where α0, α1, α2 are 
complex number where   
 
     
 
     
 
     . 
Then, Alice generates a secret string of qutrits |T> and the 
private key is related with measurement operators where: 
            |       |          |    } and 
measurement operators 
                             .  
 After that, the secret string qutrits is measured with the 
related key measurement operators, this value will be used 
later to compare with the signer value to check whether it was 
changed during signing.  
               |          |         |   } 
To sign the secret message, Bob inserts his private 
information in to it without knowing that the contents of the 
message. Bob generates a qutrit string of his own personal 
information |ψp>, where n qutrits in the string, can be shown 
as:  
                                
Also, Bob assume that Alice does not know the content of 
his personal information and cannot access it. |ψp> is 
encrypted using Kbc which will be combined with a sequence 
of measurement operators Mkbc, where: 
The key            
       
         
          
  
Bob should check his qutrits |ψp> and gets: 
                                   
In order to have a quantum blind signature for the secret 
trying message, Bob will use kab, to encrypt |T> and |P> to 
obtain the blind signature: 
                
Finally, Bob sends Sb to Alice and waits for the signature 
Verification. 
C.  Verifying the signature  
First, Alice got Sb as shown before and he decrypts it 
using kab. Alice obtains |T
’
> and |P
’
>, then she can get |ψ
’
M1> 
by decrypting |T
’
> using her private key Ka.  
Second, Alice checks if the signature is blind. She verifies 
that by comparing |ψ
’
M1> to her |ψM1> that chosen in the first 
trying quantum blind signature. If |ψ
’
M1> does not equal |ψM1>, 
then the message has been compromised by someone who was 
trying to reveal part of the content of the secret message. This 
will lead to dropping the message and start again. However, if 
they are equal, we can assume that the content of the message 
were not compromised and at this stage the blind signature has 
started. Then, |P> will be sent by Bob to Trend. It can be 
obtained by encrypting |ψp> using Mkbc. Bob will send it to 
Trend through the quantum channel since no other than them 
can know |P>. After that, Alice sends |P
’
> to Trent.  
Finally, since Trend has |P> and |P
’
>, he will verify the 
authenticity of the signature. He checks if |P> = |P
’
>, and 
decrypts |P> and |P
’
>, using Kbc. Trend has already |ψp> and 
|ψ
’
p> and he will check if |P> = |P
’
>, |ψM1>= |ψ
’
M1> and |ψp> = 
|ψ
’
p>, which means we got successfully the trying blind 
signature. Since we got the trying blind signature authentic 
and blindness, Trend sends a message to Alice and Bob about 
the result and can communicate safely. However, if one of the 
previous conditions has not been met, the communication will 
be dropped.  
IV. PROCESS OF ENCRYPTION AND DECRYPTING OF QUBIT  
As shown in Fig.  3, we have a string of n qubit that can 
be expressed as:  
                                
Also, the hybrid key contains two types of keys, quantum 
key and binary key that are involved in the process of 
encryption and decryption. The quantum key can be 
represented as follow:  
                                      
Binary key as: K2=k21k22…k2s ∈ {0, 1} 
We assume that the two keys are distributed in advance to 
Alice and Bob in a secure way and can be used for future 
communications if it has not been hacked. The purpose of the 
classical channel is to detect the presence of Eve who wants to 
access the information. We will apply Hadamard gate and 
Controlled-NOT gate in the encryption and decryption.  
 
    
Fig.  3: Qubit of encryption and decryption 
V. PROCESS OF DECRYPTION OF QUBIT WITHOUT HAVING EVE 
IN BETWEEN 
Trend Decrypts Bob’s Qubits (Original Data) using BC 
key (part1), after that, Trend Decrypts Bob’s Qubits that was 
send by Alice by BC key (part2). The process is shown in 
Table 1. 
TABLE1: DECRYPTION OF QUBITS WITHOUT EVE 
Part1  Part2 
M α 0 α 1  M α 0 α 1 
Q1 0.4 0.6  Q1 0.4 0.6 
Q2 0.3 0.7  Q2 0.3 0.7 
Q3 0.2 0.8  Q3 0.2 0.8 
Q4 0.1 0.9  Q4 0.1 0.9 
Q5 0.7 0.3  Q5 0.7 0.3 
Q6 0.8 0.2  Q6 0.8 0.2 
Q7 0.9 0.1  Q7 0.9 0.1 
Q8 0.3 0.7  Q8 0.3 0.7 
Q9 0.2 0.8  Q9 0.2 0.8 
Q10 0.4 0.6  Q10 0.4 0.6 
Q11 0.5 0.5  Q11 0.5 0.5 
Q12 0.8 0.2  Q12 0.8 0.2 
VI.  THE PROCESS OF THE DECRYPTION OF QUBIT HAVING EVE 
IN BETWEEN 
Trend Decrypted Bobs Qubits that was send by Alice by BC 
key as in Table 2. 
TABLE2: DECRYPTION OF QUBITS WITH EVE 
M α 0 α 1 
Q1 -0.2 0.0 
Q2 -0.1 0.3 
Q3 -1.1 -0.5 
Q4 -0.4 0.4 
Q5 0.3 -0.1 
Q6 0.2 -0.4 
Q7 0.6 -0.2 
Q8 -0.1 0.3 
Q9 -1.1 -0.5 
Q10 -0.4 -0.2 
Q11 0.0 0.0 
Q12 -1.7 -2.3 
 
VII. PROCESS OF DECRYPTION OF QUTRITS WITHOUT HAVING 
EVE IN BETWEEN 
Trend decrypts Bob’s Qutrits (original data) using BC key 
(Part1), after that, Trent Decrypted Bobs Qutrits that was send 
by Alice by BC key (part2) as shown in Table 3. 
TABLE3: DECRYPTION OF QUIRITS WITHOUT EVE 
Part1  Part2 
M α 0 α 1 α 2  M α 0 α 1 α 2 
 Q1 0.1 0.6 0.3  Q1 0.1 0.6 0.3 
Q2 0.3 0.4 0.3  Q2 0.3 0.4 0.3 
Q3 0.2 0.6 0.2  Q3 0.2 0.6 0.2 
Q4 0.3 0.6 0.1  Q4 0.3 0.6 0.1 
Q5 0.2 0.3 0.5  Q5 0.2 0.3 0.5 
Q6 0.2 0.2 0.6  Q6 0.2 0.2 0.6 
Q7 0.6 0.1 0.3  Q7 0.6 0.1 0.3 
Q8 0.3 0.4 0.3  Q8 0.3 0.4 0.3 
Q9 0.3 0.5 0.2  Q9 0.3 0.5 0.2 
Q10 0.3 0.6 0.1  Q10 0.3 0.6 0.1 
Q11 0.2 0.3 0.5  Q11 0.2 0.3 0.5 
Q12 0.2 0.2 0.6  Q12 0.2 0.2 0.6 
  
VIII. THE PROCESS OF THE DECRYPTION OF QUTRITS HAVING 
EVE IN BETWEEN 
Trend Decrypts Bobs Qutrits that was send by Alice by 
BC key as shown in Table 4.  
 
TABLE4: DECRYPTION OF QUTRITS WITH EVE 
M α 0 α 1 α 2 
Q1 -1.6 -1.1 -1.4 
Q2 -2.2 -2.1 -2.2 
Q3 -1.5 -1.1 -1.5 
Q4 -1.4 -1.1 -1.6 
Q5 -3.1 -3 -2.8 
Q6 -4.8 -4.8 -4.4 
Q7 -9.4 -9.9 -9.7 
Q8 -2.2 -2.1 -2.2 
Q9 -1.7 -1.5 -1.8 
Q10 -1.4 -1.1 -1.6 
Q11 -3.1 -3 -2.8 
Q12 -4.8 -4.8 -4.4 
IX. ANALYSIS OF THE PROPOSED ALGORITHM 
The scheme introduced in [1] is using qutrits during the 
communication and the encryption is not discussed clearly in 
the paper. In this paper we propose that during the 
communication, the qubit and qutrits should be encrypted to 
improve the security of the scheme. Also we have shown that 
the new development can make it easier to detect any attempt 
by any illegitimate node to change the original content at any 
phase with the help of Trend who is responsible for 
authentication and verification of the signature during the 
communication. 
In general we can say that the current scheme is more 
secure and more efficient. Also, it provides many security 
features such Impossibility of forgery and prevention of denial 
by the receiver. These two features are explained in this 
section  
A. Preventing forgery 
During the communication steps that we have discussed 
before, there are two eigenstate for qubit bit and three 
eigenstate for qutrits. This is a main feature that enables us to 
make it impossible for Eve to attack the communication. Also, 
if one of the communicating parties turns to be malicious and 
wants to access unauthorized, it can be detected. If Alice tries 
to sign one of Bob's messages pretending by forging Bob’s 
personal signature, she will be detected in the verification 
phase. If Trend compares |Ps> and |P>, he will find out they 
are different which leads to abolishing the signing phase. 
Also, if an attacker tried to imitate Bob's signature, he will be 
detected in the initial phase. 
B. Preventing repudiation by the receiver 
Another feature that is supported by this scheme is 
preventing denial by the receiver. Let's assume Alice tried to 
deny Bob's signature. In the Verification phase, Alice obtains 
|P> and |T> by encrypting Sb using Kab. If |P
’
> is fake 
information of Bob. when Trend finds |P> = |P
’
> and |ψp> = 
|ψ
’
p>, in this case, Trend will send the result to Alice and Bob 
telling them that trying blind signature is authentic but if one 
of the conditions is missing, the process will stop at this stage. 
In other words, Alice and Bob are not able to deny the 
signature of one of them. However, if one of them denies the 
signature, Trend will detect it that and they will stop the 
communication.  
TABLE5 
Hadamard and C-Not Gates Sizes (Matrices) for Qubits and 
Qutrits (After Tensor Product Between Encrypted Qubit 
and Quantum Key) 
Hadamard C-not 
Qubits Qutrits Qubits Qutrits 
4 X 4 
 
16 X 16 
 
4 X 4 
 
16 X 16 
 
8 X 8 
 
64 X 64 
 
8 X 8 
 
64 X 64 
 
X. CONCLUSIONS 
In this paper, we have improved the communication 
Scheme for Blind Signature with Two-Particle Entangled 
Quantum-Trits. We have applied a two-particle entangled 
quantum-qubits and qutrits. The new implementation 
improves security of the scheme where it is harder for 
attackers to break. Furthermore, implementation of encryption 
t using encrypted qubits and qutrits during the communication 
provides higher efficiency. Finally, the scheme has several 
new enhanced security features such as preventing forgery 
within the parties and eliminating the possibility of 
repudiation of a signee. 
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